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Chapter XXI
Panel Discussion: Panel IV
The Existing Legal Framework, Part II
Protecting the Environment During
Non-International Armed Conflict Involving
the Use of Force
Rear Admiral Horace B. Robertson, Jr., JAGC, U.S. Navy (Ret.): Good
Morning, I am Robbie Robertson, moderator for this panel. Having heard from
the previous panel on the existing legal framework for protecting the environment
during international armed conflict, we now turn to an examination of the existing
legal framework for protecting the environment during non-international armed
conflict operations involving the use of force. That is, "military operations other
than war," sometimes abbreviated as MOOTW.
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3110.03 defines MOOTW as, "The
use of military capabilities across the range of military operations short of war."
Protecting the environment in such operations could embrace a continuum of
actions ranging from the most mundane, such as the proper disposal of garbage at
sea, through oil spills created by attempts to enforce an oil embargo, all the way
up to target selection for air strikes to enforce protected zones in Bosnia. Colonel
Burger will address this latter conflict, or non-conflict, in detail. You may wish to
challenge the assertion that I believe he will make that NATO considers this a
MOOTWoperation.
To discuss our topic, we have four eminent experts, two of whom will
summarize their papers which are being distributed, and two of whom will
comment. In order to allow time for discussion at the end, our two principal
speakers have agreed to limit their remarks to 20 minutes and our commentators
to 15 minutes. Rather than interrupt their flow, I will introduce all of them now
in the order in which they will speak:
First, Rear Admiral Bruce Harlow, JAGC, U.S. Navy, Retired. Admiral Harlow
had a distinguished 28-year career as a JAG Corps Officer, culminating in his
service as Assistant Judge Advocate General of the Navy, andJCS and Department
of Defense Representative for Ocean Policy Affairs. Additionally, he was Vice
Chairman of the U.S. Delegation to the Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the
Sea. He stays active in the international law field as a consultant to the Air Force
and lecturer at the Naval War College.
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Colonel Jim Burger, JAGC, U.S. Army, has had a 26-year career in the Army
JAG Corps with extensive tours of duty in international and operational law. He
is currently Legal Adviser to the Commander of NATO, Allied Forces South in
Naples, Italy, the commander of the forces engaged in the NATO air strikes in
Bosnia.
Dr. Raul Vinuesa is a distinguished professor of international law and human
rights at the University of Buenos Aires, the Institute of Foreign Service of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Argentine Naval War College. He also serves
in other advisory capacities in the Argentine Government and around the world.
Professor Ted Meron is a well-respected professor of international law at New
York University School of Law specializing in human rights and international
humanitarian law. Among his many other roles, he is Editor in Chief of the
American Journal ofInternational Law, the official publication of the American
Society of International Law. I am sure that many of you have been amused, as
well as enlightened, by his recent article which got widespread comment entitled,
"Shakespeare's Henry V, and the Law of War" at that time.
Without further ado I present Admiral Harlow.
Rear Admiral Bruce A. Harlow,JAGC, U.S. Navy (Ret.): Thank you very much.
I do not know ifit is an environmentalissue, but! heard this morning that Saddam
Hussein has seized 1,000 lawyers and threatens to release them 100 per week unless
his demands are met. [Laughter.] At the outset, I would like to make a couple of
general comments on the discussion that we heard yesterday and this morning.
Yesterday, reference was made to documentation from an Iraqi official which
clearly indicated the burning of the oil wells in Kuwait was vindictive. The
inference that one could draw, I do not think it was intended but one could draw
it, was that the confession of this intent along with the act would clearly indicate
the illegality of the act itself. I would emphasize, however, that the admission of
evil intent does not make an act illegal, in my judgment, any more than profession
of pure intent makes an otherwise unlawful act legal. I think that although
confession of error may bear some relevance in the examination of the legality of
an act, one must look to the act itself, the consequences of the act, and the
circumstances under which the act was undertaken to assess the legality or
illegality of the act.
In the United States, at least in my experience, to describe a single intent for
anything we do, is a mission impossible. The reality is that if there are 14 officials
involved in a decision, they are coming from 14 different intents. I think it is a
rather futile effort to discuss the intent of an international act. Reference was made
to oil tankers. The hint that I drew from that was perhaps that oil tankers should
be declared a prohibitive target. Again, perhaps that was not intended, but I would
like to make the point that this would be a dangerous approach. Indeed, any strict
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list of prohibitions is a dangerous approach, because it presumes that we can
predict the future. It presumes that we can predict the circumstances under which
we may want to target an oil tanker and that reasonable men would agree that the
consequences, including environmental consequences, are outweighed by the
human and national security needs that may pertain to the situation. I think it is
a mistake to attempt to prejudge the future and deviate from the basic principles
of proportionality and necessity.
I would like to recognize Commander Mike McGregor who co-authored our
paper and, indeed, wrote a significant portion of it. We both hope that you will
have a chance to read the paper and we would very much appreciate any comments
you might have. Now, as Admiral Robertson pointed out, the topic before us is
environmental considerations during military operations other than war. One
difficulty I have, personally, with that is that I have never met a U.S. attorney that
can intelligently defme what war is in this context.
I define it for this purpose as armed conflict. So for the purpose of our paper
and for my discussion this morning, I am talking in terms of military operations
which are limited to those actions that are not premised on the extraordinary right
of self-defense. Therefore, the military operations that I am talking about do not
involve the use or threat of force except perhaps in a law enforcement mode but
not in a warfighting mode. In this context, I believe it is reasonable to conclude
that military forces must generally comply with accepted principles of customary
and treaty law applicable to the State in which they are operating.
This rule of law, in my judgment, can be summarized as follows: States, to the
extent practicable under the circumstances, must not cause significant injury to
the environment of other States or to international areas. Ipso facto this obligation
carries with it a duty to assess environmental implications before the fact. As
mentioned yesterday, as far as the United States is concerned, an Executive Order
of the President and Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance require such an assessment
where military forces are involved. Under international law, States are free to
somewhat degrade their own environment assuming the impact does not extend
beyond their borders. I would suppose, therefore, as a matter of international law,
that armed forces involved in operations other than war (read armed conflict) are
only obligated to comply with the standards of the State in which they are
operating, even if the domestic standards of the host State which is supplying the
armed forces are stricter-sort ofthe "lowest common denominator" rule.
It should be emphasized that once forces are involved in armed conflict, the
laws of war-the principles of proportionality and necessity-would pertain, and,
indeed, would, under certain circumstances, displace and/or mold normal
peacetime principles. What I envision in this middle world of non-violent use of
armed forces, whether it be for constructing a refugee camp or humanitarian
assistance, we should follow the normal peacetime rules as is generally the practice
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with regard to ICAO rules for the air navigation of military aircraft throughout
the world. Although the United States military makes it perfectly clear that
military aircraft are not bound under all circumstances to comply with ICAO
safety and navigational rules, generally speaking in the peacetime environment
milieu, military aircraft do comply with those rules. I think the military flight
patterns throughout the world in the last 40 years have proven to be
non-threatening and have been basically neighborly with commercial air
navigation throughout the world.
I have to reemphasize the point that when we are talking about the exercise of
the extraordinary right of self-defense or extraordinary circumstances, military
aircraft should, and must be allowed the freedom to exercise the rights that would
be premised upon these extraordinary requirements. So it might be true, with
regard to environmental rules, that under normal peacetime circumstances, armed
forces would comply with the international standards and norms expected of all
other State officials. It would be the exception that would apply only when we are
exercising the extraordinary right of self-defense.
It is also true that although States, under existing international law in our view,
are free to degrade the environment, more and more States are enacting domestic
legislation to establish minimum standards. As this number grows-there are now
around 40 States that have environmental standards that apply domestically-as
the thought grows that domestic environmental practices do have at least an
indirect effect on the world community, I think emerging international law will
follow the principle that a minimum environmental standard is required of each
nation-State as an element of human rights. If that be true, then eventually one
can envision international standards that would be applicable even to domestic
practices even though the impact of such domestic practices might not be felt
beyond the borders of the State or in an international area.
Finally, let me make this contextual point. It must be recognized that effective
measures to protect and conserve the global environment will involve significant
costs and policy tradeoffs. International legal norms designed to protect the
environment, unless they are to be observed in the breach, must take into
consideration economic, political and national security realities. A
well-considered, balanced, cost-effective international and economically oriented
environmental regime, could, however, serve important interests of the world
community, well into the convoluted and complex multi-polar world of the
Twenty-First Century. Thank you.
Colonel James A. Burger, JAGC, U.S. Army, Staff Judge Advocate, Allied
Forces EuropelHQ AFSOUTH: As has already been mentioned, I am going to
address the material covered in my paper on the ongoing conflict in the former
Republic of Yugoslavia. I think it certainly is a conflict which has been in the
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forefront of most peoples' minds when they think of what is going on in conflicts
today. Maybe it is also a sign of the type of conflicts that we have in today's world,
and we might continue to have in the future.
I also think that it is important because this conflict has had a profound affect
on the environment. I think it is appropriate for this Conference to look at how
we have dealt with environmental problems in this conflict. I did have some
problem when I began preparing to write my paper trying to identify what type of
conflict this was. Within the circles of the military people dealing with the
problem, there is a lot of debate about this. It is probably the most extensive
peacekeeping operation that we have had in the world's history. Certainly, we have
sent thousands of peacekeepers in and created an extensive "peacekeeping"
mission. We have also gotten into the debate of whether this is becoming a
"peacemaking" mission, whatever that is.
But when I analyzed what has happened and looked at the rules that we are
applying, I had to conclude that no matter what else, this was a limited operation.
It was not a full-blown international conflict, at least as far as we who were sent
there are concerned. The U.N. forces were sent there as "peacekeepers." The
NATO forces that were sent there, although to help the U.N., have, perhaps,
become "peacemakers."
There are limits; everything that we are doing had to be authorized by a U.N.
resolution and a NATO mandate. We are going to follow those mandates and not
go beyond them. Also, this has been an extremely complex operation ip-volving
U.N. peacekeeping. The U.N. was first sent in to separate the Serbians and the
Croatians in the Krajina area. It was the humanitarian relief operation in Bosnia
proper, which was a separate operation from the peacekeeping operation. We had
the embargo operation at sea, Sharp Guard, which is a NATO operation and Deny
Flight, the air operation which maintained a "no-fly zone" over Bosnia and also
which came to the aid of the U.N. forces. More recently, it has tried to protect the
so-called "safe areas." And, most recently, to protect Sarajevo. That was what this
recent bombing campaign was all about. So, extremely complex operations
involving land forces, air forces, and sea forces present all sorts of problems in the
environmental area which I think will be interesting for us to look at.
The fact that the environment has been affected by the conflict is undeniable.
First, because of the intense fighting which has been going on in the area. Second,
due to the movements of popUlations which you see on television. There are
thousands of people being forced to move from one area of the country to another.
Some of this is deliberately forced, with the burning of houses and farms and that
sort of thing.
You also have the scale of the peacekeeping operation itself. There are
thousands of peacekeepers, and supply convoys, and all of this being put into a
relatively small area can not help but have an effect on the environment-the
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embargo operation, the sea operation, the possibility ofoil spills and the discharges
from ships, the air operation carrying of hazardous cargoes, the possible pollution
from operating airports and facilities and those things which are applicable to the
land operations as well. We see all of the problems coming out of military
operations having an effect on the environment.
My paper asks how have we dealt with these problems. I tried to examine the
type of rules that we have set up for ourselves and how we have tried to exercise
restraint and control for the protection of the environment. While environmental
problems may not have been the foremost thing on peoples' minds in regard to
this conflict, it certainly was considered. There were many things that were done
to protect the environment.
Our operational plans have several very important annexes. They include the
Rules of Engagement Annex, which sets out the rules which apply to actual
military operations; and the Legal Annex, which sets out those legal rules which
apply to all of the other things not covered in the Rules of Engagement Annex.
Both of these Annexes start out with a statement regarding the preservation of the
environment, that we will apply applicable rules of law-including the law of
armed conflict, the law of the sea and national rules that may apply to the
environment within the countries concerned. All of these rules of law set limits
upon what our armed forces could do and how they are to conduct their operations.
Looking first at the rules of engagement. Even though not all of the
participating nations were parties to the Additional Protocols, we looked to the
Protocols as a good statement of many of the customary rules of armed conflict
but we did not want to say that the full panoply would apply. We took the position,
and it was clearly stated in the rules of engagement, that we would require the
forces to follow the rules of armed conflict. I think these would include those
customary law rules that are set out in the Additional Protocols, and the Additional
Protocols do, of course, mention environmental protection, Article 35 and Article
55, which have already been cited.
More importantly though, all of the rules of the law of armed conflict were very
germane and had to be considered in attempting to limit collateral damage which
was important in protecting the environment.
I mentioned the Legal Annexes which cite that the legal rules are generally
applicable either in the air, on the sea, or on the land. The Law of the Sea
Convention has articles regarding environmental protection, Article 192 and
Article 194. These rules are being applied to Operation Sharp Guard. In regard to
air operations, I mentioned in my paper the Basel Convention on Transboundry
Movement of Hazardous Wastes. Certainly, we carry a lot of hazardous cargo in
our air operations. Accidents have to be prevented and the places where these
cargoes are stored have to be well maintained so that the materials are kept safely
and do not pollute the surrounding environment.
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Another area covered in the Legal Annexes is the responsibility for damages.
This was mainly in the context of the payment of claims. The United Nations has
a very extensive claims payment program. The policy of the U.N. is not to pay
claims for regular operations where there is no fault or where things are done in
the line of duty. However, the U.N. does pay claims where there is some sort of
fault or negligence involved. We have had a number of instances where
environmental type claims have been paid by the U.N. Of course, since we have
had NATO forces and other national forces operating there as well, we have
received claims at NATO. Individual nations have also received claims coming
out of the Yugoslavia conflict. I think it is important to address the issue of claims
because if there is a responsibility for the payment of claims then the nations
participating will hopefully take measures to try to prevent the occurrence of
claims by taking precautions against environmental damage.
Another area covered by my paper involves the agreements that we have
between or among nations. There is the U.N. Model SOFA; the U.N. has executed
or contracted a model SOFA agreement with the Bosnians and, more recently,
with the Croatians. One of the provisions in this SOFA is that there will be respect
for the law of the receiving State. NATO is also negotiating SOFA agreements that
would go into effect if this becomes a NATO operation. If NATO went in to help
U.N. forces withdraw or as part ofa peacekeeping operation, there would be NATO
SOFA agreements stating that there would be respect for the law of the receiving
State. I say "respect" because there is something you have to be very. careful of
here. A country may have a very sophisticated environmental program that cannot
be complied with during conflict. But there certainly would be respect for the rules
and that respect would include environmental protections.
Another type of agreement might be those between the participating parties,
between the U.N. and NATO, or between the NATO participants. These
agreements might set out who is responsible for claims, how they are going to be
investigated, how you are going to assess responsibility, and which party is going
to have to pay damages.
I made some generalizations at the end of my paper. The most important and
primary is that environmental rules have to be applied to all conflicts, even those
that are non-international or are true humanitarian operations. The
environmental rules and the rules which apply to armed conflict have to be
recognized. Our forces must be advised that there are a set of rules which they are
expected to obey. Our rules of engagement make clear that we will comply with
the law of armed conflict no matter what type of conflict it is. In fact, we
deliberately avoid characterizing the conflict. We just enjoin our forces to comply
with the law of armed conflict. A second generalization of my paper is that you
must recognize the responsibility of our forces to respect the laws of the receiving
State. We utilize Status of Forces Agreements to do so. Our operations in the
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former-Yugoslavia has given us a great deal of practical experience in how to
address environmental problems. If you take the position that, yes, we do have a
problem here, an environmental problem, and then try as best you can to work
that problem, we will have accomplished a great deal. Our experience in Yugoslavia
has, at least, been a beginning, a beginning we can look back upon in later years
and draw some value from it.
Thank you.
Dr. Raul E. Vinuesa, University of Buenos Aires: Thank you. I have assumed
the role as commentator so I will not deliver my own approach about
non-international armed conflicts but instead will make a few remarks on the
subject.
This is a very difficult task because the main topic is: "The Existing Legal
Framework." After reading both of the very accurate and appropriate papers of
our presenters, I tried to squeeze out of them what the law was, and I have had
some difficulties because I found out, for instance, that United Nations
peacekeeping operations are being considered as part of "military operations other
than war." Let me, as my first comment, try to make a distinction within the topic
that we are now dealing with, which is protection of the environment during
non-international armed conflicts. In my view, there are military operations other
than war that could be related to non-international armed conflict but also could
be related to just the simple use of force in compliance with international law. If,
for example, we are thinking of new rules for the conservation of highly migratory
fisheries, which will come to the U.N. General Assembly for consideration in
December, you will see that Articles 21 and 22 of the draft convention talk about
the "use of force" but do not define what that "use of force" is. If it means force
which will involve military operations other than war, the law applicable in time
of peace should continue to apply.
So having said that, I will just take one second to deal with what is going on in
non-international armed conflict operations in which there is no external
intervention. When I refer to external intervention I mean any third party
intervention as in recent experiences within former-Yugoslavia "peacekeeping
operations. "
If, during an internal armed conflict, there is no peacekeeping operation and
there is no third State intervention, what is the applicable law here? Additional
Protocol II, but most probably the State in which the insurgency or internal armed
conflict is taking place is not a party to it. That will be one of the main problems.
Even if that State is a party to Additional Protocol II, it is very difficult to think
that Articles 14 and 15 of that Protocol will cover the protection of the whole
environment as such. Protocol II only concerns the protection and the survival of
the civilian population which will, in a collateral way, protect the environment.
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So basically what remains to be applied to the foregoing situations is just internal
law.
In that sense, a problem oflegallacunae will arise because any number of States
have not developed domestic law regarding environmental protection in general,
and certainly not in terms of armed conflicts, even internal armed conflicts. In one
of the papers just presented to us there is a very accurate commentabout new trends
or new developments within domestic law in which reference is made to several
examples where constitutions and other internal statutes have introduced
regulations concerning the protection of the environment. I could add another
example to that list with the Argentine Constitution, as reformed in 1994. It
includes an impressive new section dealing with very basic general principles on
environmental protection. But no one knows what it really means in practical
terms because it is a pure programmatic declaration without immediate direct
possibility to be implemented. But at least it is good for it to be there. We will see
how that is developed.
So what is finally the applicable law for those situations in which there is no
domestic law to be observed? I think there is a possibility to consider the
applicability of general and basic principles recognized world-wide which are
linked to an historical development approach within international environmental
law. Through analogy, and by implication, we can depart from the general
principle that expresses the duty not to damage other States and areas beyond
national jurisdiction. But that seems rather dangerous because its direct
consequence would be that as long as a State produces environmental damage
within its own territory, the nonexistence of internal legal obligations would
permit virtually unlimited damage to the environment. On the contrary, States
must observe, even when involved in an internal armed conflict, their duty not to
affect the environmental interests of other States or of the international
community as a whole. State responsibility would only emerge when the effects of
internal activities expands national frontiers.
Let me conclude on that issue that international standards pertaining to
environment protection, per se, are very poorly developed. But most of our
expectations to reverse that situation would not necessarily be concentrated on the
international level but on future domestic legislation where basic uniform
standards could influence what is going on within the territory of individual
countries.
The prior panel addressed international armed conflict and I will not address
that. What I will address is what I will call a "mixed situation" involving
peacekeeping forces not directly involved in combat. In most instances those forces
have much stricter obligations than domestic belligerents. They are governed by
conventional arrangements among the participating nations comprising the
peacekeeping forces. They also have their own national rules of engagement that
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they use when they come across a common problem. Still, they have very basic
principles that they have to adhere to during the intervention.
But as they are not involved in combat, there will be few situations in which
damage to the environment could be justified by military necessity by
peacekeeping forces.
Let me explain what that means. It is arguably an internationalization of the
conflict when peacekeeping operations are introduced into a specific internal
conflict. This is something that really complicates the whole subject. Even in the
former-Yugoslavia situation, the question will be whether the peacekeeping
operations/intervention would impart international armed conflict obligations on
the internal belligerents, but not, of course, on peacekeepers who have their own
obligations, rules of engagement and conventional agreements.
Considering military operations other than war, and I want to make a
distinction between peacekeeping operations and other military operations, which
implies the use of force performed in compliance of international law. Once again,
the example I gave before on the law of the sea regarding unilateral actions in which
some use offorce is legally justified. The fisheries conservation policies prescribed
by the Law of the Sea Convention and the new draft agreement on highly migratory
fish stocks, allow the use of force outside the 200 mile exclusive economic zone
under international standards. Why? Because most of those operations will take
place in areas under international jurisdiction.
With regard to military operations in general, if you perform them in your own
territory it is your own environmental problem. If you cross a border, or you get
into a complicated jurisdiction that is beyond your national jurisdiction, I think
we enter a different scheme which is basically international environmental law
applicable in peacetime.
As a final reflection, I think that we are dealing here with the very basics of the
Fourth Hague Convention, a Convention that limits the use offorce in war. These
same principles have been applied to protect the environment in the course of
military operations during time of peace as well.
Finally, I would like to mention that the papers submitted by our panelists have
examined the relationship between environmental protection and human rights.
We have come to appreciate that the environment is not just the habitat in which
human beings develop their lives. In the past, however, protection of the
environment during armed conflict has been dealt with as a sort of collateral effect
derived from the protection of individuals.
We are in a transitional phase in which new trends, not law but trends, related
to the generation of a universal consciousness towards the protection of the
environment are reflected in rules of engagement, especially those rules applied
by certain developed countries not only concerning peacekeeping operations, but
mainly concerning any military operations. I believe that those attitudes provide
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a strong input of how to internally tackle the environment during internal armed
conflicts.
Rules of engagement on an international level will be the aggregate means to
implement and enforce these developing standards. I stress this idea of developing
standards because I am not quite sure what the law is respecting non-international
armed conflicts. On the other hand, it could be perceived that as of today, there
are developing standards concerning environmental protection during all sorts of
military operations other than war, not just restricted to operations in which
peacekeeping forces are involved. Thank you.
Professor Theodor Meron, New York University: I am grateful to Captain Jack
Grunawalt for having invited me to this very timely, interesting and stimulating
conference. I think that you, sir, deserve special thanks for bringing together a
group of academic civilian and military experts on law and environment for a
discussion of this extremely important subject. I would think that meetings and
dialogues of this kind are something that we need even more in the future. If! may
make a personal comment, it is that people are not aware of the extremely
important work in international law that is being done in the military community.
In assessing protection of the environment in non-international armed
conflicts, one must keep in mind certain basic considerations. First, to be effective,
protection of the environment must be continuous. It cannot depend on
differences between peace, war and civil war. It is encouraging to note that there
is an emerging consensus that what is prohibited for international wars cannot be
tolerated in civil wars. Second, as we all know, instrUments protecting the
environment in non-international armed conflict are considered to be weaker than
those applicable to international wars. The reason for this weakness, and this is
the heart of the problem, is not merely technical. It reflects the traditional
reluctance of States to recognize international constraints on the conduct of civil
war within national territories. The critical stakes involved in this conflict,
namely, survival of authorities and power, partition of territory, movements of
population, the challenge of identifying the actors responsible for especially
grievous violations of the environment, imputabilities and responsibility issues,
all act to create formidable difficulties confronting the international community
in trying to improve the protection of the environment in non-international armed
conflicts. How to bind insurgents through rules ofinternationallaw continues, of
course, to be a very major problem. Of course, quite a few successes have been
pointed out by some of our colleagues and quite a few of our present difficulties
could be at least attenuated through good faith and respect for already existing
principles. But the undeniable normative weakness plays, I suggest, into the hands
of those who tend to pay little respect to existing rules.
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There has nevertheless emerged an encouraging though tentative trend towards
the extension of some law of war treaties and some arms control treaties of major
environmental significance to non-international armed conflict, and I would like
to mention briefly some of these treaties. This is already positive international law,
not something futuristic. Consider, for instance, the applicability of some parts of
the 1954 Hague Convention on the protection of cultural property to
non-international armed conflict. Consider the applicability of the 1972 Biological
Weapons Convention in all circumstances, including non-international armed
conflicts. Or consider the applicability of the 1993 Chemical Weapons Convention
to all conflicts, international or internal, and so on.
And most recently, I would like to draw your attention to the proposals before
the Review Conference of States party to the United Nations Conventional
Weapons Convention of 1980 to extend the prohibitions contained in Additional
Protocol II on land mines, et cetera, to non-international armed conflicts. Although
I share Dr. McNeill's skepticism expressed in his excellent article in the 1993
Hague Yearbook ofInternational Law about prospects for a drastic expansion by
treaty of environmental protections applicable in time of war, I would not rule out
the possibility of a fairer, modestly focused expansion by treaty of environmental
protection to non-international armed conflicts. We have seen this in the treaties
which I have briefly mentioned to you and have seen that this sort of expansion
can also be focused on particularly important objects or essential environmental
assets.
Moreover, as is noted in my paper, we "had hoped the ENMOD Convention was
applicable in other circumstances. Some other environmental treaties, such as
those protecting endangered species, their habitats and other particularly
vulnerable environmental assets would, I suggest, not make much sense unless
they were construed as applicable in all conflict situations. In the ICRC Experts
Committee in which I participated together with several other people present here
such as Professor Bothe, a suggestion was made that all major environmental
treaties should be studied with a view towards ascertaining whether they would
be applicable in a time of war including non-international armed conflict. I
strongly support the comments made in this regard by my colleague and friend
Paul Szasz this morning. A point here of relevance is whether it would not be
possible to try and see whether in future treaties dealing with the environment we
could not, whenever possible, incorporate explicit language dealing with this
problem.
Now, the difficulty noted by, among others, Colonel Burger a few minutes ago
of classifying conflicts as either international or internal, provides a powerful
argument, I submit, for the application of the more protective rules which are
applicable normally in international armed conflicts. Colonel Burger, for example,
appears to treat the conflict in Yugoslavia as primarily non-international armed
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conflict. Yet, the United States Government, in its omnibus brief submitted to the
Hague Criminal Tribunal, has asserted very strongly and categorically that the
entire set of conflicts in Yugoslavia constitute international, not internal armed
conflicts.
In attempting to enhance in the future, protection of the environment in
non-international armed conflict, I would like to point to several approaches which
are not mutually exclusive. I already mentioned that the treaty making or law
making approach, while useful in specific areas, does not hold much promise, as
we have seen from the discussion of the earlier panelists, for the future in the
present circumstances. Professor Oxman's suggestion, voiced in his 1991 article,
that additional treaty protection could be created for objects of special
environmental importance deserves, however, careful consideration.
The second approach is to try to strengthen national peacetime environmental
policies. Strengthening national environmental policy, law and education during
periods of peace may, in practice, contribute to de-legitimatizing those acts which
are really disastrous for the environment in time of internal war, whether carried
out by the government or by rebels as those two groups battle for the hearts and
minds of men.
There is also the interpretive approach. Wherever possible, we should try to
construe environmental treaties which are silent on their applicability in time of
war as continuing in effect during non-international armed conflicts. The 1993
ICRC report to the United Nations General Assembly makes this point very
strongly. Of course, absent international wars, there is no justification for
suspending international treaties on grounds ofwar within sovereign States. There
remains, however, a rather troublesome possibility of a State trying to suspend
such treaties on grounds of national emergency, necessity, or force majeure. Other
States should be skeptical of such justifications for treaty suspension. Ideally, of
course, environmental treaties should provide for non-derogability, or at least for
as narrow a derogability as possible.
Fourth is the human rights connection. As we all know, there is an important
school of thought linking vrotection of the environment in time of war, including
of course civil war, with protection of human rights. The recent decision of the
European Court of Human Rights in the case of Lopez, Ostra v. Spain has given
new vitality to the human rights connection of environmental protections. Of
course, respect of human rights has always suffered from claims of derogability on
grounds of national emergency.
Fifth is the customary laws strategy. I refer to the Martens Clause which
encapsulates the reservoir of general principles in customary law which limits the
discretion of the military commander and suggests that military commanders
select those tactical solutions that are most beneficial to the protection of the
environment. This would include also such general law of war principles as that
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of proportionality, the prohibition of causing unnecessary damage or wanton
destruction, and perhaps also some principles of State responsibility. Perhaps the
single most important challenge at the present date is to recognize that these
principles rooted in the Hague law and confirmed to a certain extent by the Geneva
Conventions of 1949, especially the Fourth Geneva Convention, have an
undeniable place in non-international armed conflict.
Sixth, other rules and other agreements. I refer to development of another set
of essential standards for the protection of the environment in non-international
armed conflicts to be followed by the parties to those conflicts. Compliance will
benefit from strong international pressure on the parties and from the need of the
rebels for international recognition of some kind. In other circumstances, such
other rules might be transformed into agreements between the parties and in
drafting those other rules and other agreements an attempt should be made
towards greater integration of environmental and law of war standards. This could
lead to a more significant emphasis in the law of war on such fundamental
environmental concerns as the precautionary principle and respect for future
generations. This should also be relevant to the drafting of rules of engagement,
military manuals and training models.
Seventh, mechanisms for inducing respect for existing principles. We have
spoken about that this morning, and I would like to develop that a little bit. I would
suggest that imaginative consideration should be given to the possibility of
developing more efficient scrutiny and monitoring of violations. Such
mechanisms could include, as already suggested by Jack McNeill, (1), requiring
violators ofexisting principles to pay compensation and (2), prosecuting aggressive
violators as war criminals. I would accent that such prosecutions should be
contemplated only where the existing customary law is sufficiently established to
overcome possible challenges ofex post facto. One would have to be cautious about
the applicability of simple compensatory models in the present state of the
international environment. Problems about the role of international institutions
in non-international armed conflicts are legend. But environmental protection, I
suggest, raises additional questions. Special expertise is needed in relation to
environmental issues. Ifinternational institutions are to contribute to monitoring,
to assessment and to the calibrating of process and the development of protective
measures, some environmental capacity building is desirable in the ICRC, OSCE,
the United Nations, and NATO, especially where some institutions which I have
mentioned deploy fact-finders, observers or military units. We need, perhaps, to
think of technical assistance to States involved in internal conflict in this context.
We need to raise environmental consciousness and expertise of military trainers
and foreign military advisors.
Eighth, and most important, is the problematic expansive approach. Here I
address the readiness to apply to non-international armed conflicts the broader
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and the more protective rules applicable to international armed conflicts. This
approach, as exemplified by the paper written by Admiral Harlow and even more
explicitly by Colonel Burger, pleads with regard to the conflict in the
former-Yugoslavia for respect by United Nations peacekeeping forces and NATO
forces of the more extensive environmental protection stated in Additional
Protocol I. Colonel Burger notes that the rules of engagement used by the
peacekeeping forces in Yugoslavia, and the rules of engagement proposed for the
NATO forces acting in support of the United Nations, and I quote: " ... do not
make a distinction between international and non-international conflicts," and
that any peacekeeping force will follow the environmental provisions of
Additional Protocol I, and I again quote: "... no matter how we classify the
conflict." The application of such higher standards, Colonel Burger suggests,
would apply not only to non-international armed conflicts, but also more broadly
to military operations that fall short of war.
I believe that rules of engagement offer a very attractive strategy as does the
inclusion in military manuals of environmental rules which follow, for all armed
conflicts, the most protective rules. In addition, the anthropocentric provisions of
Additional Protocol II could be broadly interpreted to provide more direct
protection to environmental assets. Most important is the emerging readiness,
which we have seen especially from General Linhard yesterday, to factor
environmental concerns into the calculus of the military commander.
None of the above approaches offers a definite or a comprehensive strategy.
Taken together, however, they suggest useful strategies for more effective
protection of the environment in a non-international armed conflict, and they
serve to facilitate the development of conventional and customary international
law in this area of growing concern.
Thank you, sir.
Admiral Robertson: Thank you Professor Meron and all our panelists. I will now
open the session to questions and comments from the floor.
Captain Stephen A. Rose, JAGC, U.S. Navy, U.S. Atlantic Command: My
question is for Colonel Burger, perhaps the panel at large. Jim, your paper has a
very optimistic assessment of the ability to weave environmental concerns into
the rules of engagement-it was done seamlessly; it was done without much sweat,
and apparently without any real dilemma for the commander. Harking back to
earlier speakers who made the same basic point about the Iraqi situation, we have
the luxury of factoring in environmental concerns without much difficulty for the
commander. Professor Roberts, however, makes a telling and useful point in his
paper. He suggests that at the higher levels there were other urgent concerns-the
use of weapons of mass destruction, the potential mistreatment of prisoners, and
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perhaps extra-territorial terrorists acts-that trumped, or at least subordinated any
environmental concerns.
The question I have for you is, in your actual discussions with the commander,
what dilemma did you face? What actual considerations or scenarios that you
discussed caused the commander to say "Wait a minute, time out, I'm not sure
what the balance here is." Because the thrust of your paper is there really wasn't a
problem, and yet I have a sense that what we are talking about is not melodrama
here, good versus bad, but good versus right, competing rights. Yet in the actual
application of all the scenarios we have talked about, I have not really seen the
ethical dilemma put forward in the context that would make the military
commander really feel awkward or feel that he has a hard choice to make.
My final point in posing this question is that in observing our panel of senior
officers yesterday, although they genuflected in the arena in the direction of
environmental concerns, I got a lot of body language that they were uncomfortable
about really being taken to task concerning a primacy of environmental concerns
when it came down to making hard choices. So, when you talked to your
commanders, what was it you discussed behind closed doors that made them feel
uncomfortable?
Colonel Burger: I am not sure I can tell you everything I discussed behind closed
doors. I am a litde surprised that you drew from mypaper that it was not a problem,
because I think it really is a very big problem, and a difficult problem.
What I meant to convey is that the recognition of the environmental rules, and
that we will follow the rules, is not in question. Our commanders did agree that
they wanted to follow the rules, and they were looking to the lawyers to point out
to them what the rules were and this included environmental rules. I should point
out that I am not the only lawyer over there. It is interesting that there were U.N.
lawyers, NATO lawyers, and national lawyers of a number of different nations all
working on these problems. Now, as to particular questions, it is difficult,
especially from the NATO point of view, because VIe really are not involved on the
ground yet. But as far as the maritime operation was concerned, it was the regular
business of trying to prevent pollution in the oceans or discharges from the ships.
These are preventative things that our navies normally do. The air forces,
generally, also take precautions in regard to their carrying of hazardous cargoes
and that type of thing. But really where we get involved in a lot of difficult problems
in a peacekeeping operation is on the ground. At that time, I think we are going
to have a lot of difficult questions, but we have not gotten to that stage yet.
Captain Rose: A quick follow up. I would argue, Q.E.D., where is the conundrum?
I mean what actually is happening in the military operations other than war arena
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that puts the ethical dilemma or the juridical dilemma to the commander? I do
not know of any scenarios. Can you cite any?
Admiral Harlow: Perhaps, to put it in perspective from the orientation of the panel
yesterday, I think it is fair to say that in the history of warfare there has been a
greater impact on human beings by direct killing than there has been by adverse
actions taken against the environment. I think we have to remind ourselves that
if the need is so great that we all agree it warrants the killing of human beings, it
is not unreasonable to conclude that collateral environmental damage, although
important, is collateral to that primary issue of justifiable homicide. The dilemma
of U.S. commanders frequently is: are the restrictions of the ROE going to result
in a greater loss of our forces? That is, will more of our young men be killed by
virtue of these restrictions? That is the way I think it was emphasized yesterday.
Dr. Myron H. Nordquist, Naval War College: My question is probably also for
Colonel Burger. I do not understand the legal theory of why NATO is in Bosnia
in the first place. We keep talking about the "rule oflaw," and I wonderifwe should
not be following constituted documents like the North Atlantic Treaty. As I
understand it, Article 5 states that there has to be an armed attack against one of
the parties for NATO to become involved. I wonder, is anybody thinking
fundamentally like "Gee, do we have the authority to be here in the first place?"
Colonel Burger: The NATO Council discussed that very thoroughly and passed
a resolution in which they said NATO was authorized to participate in
peacekeeping, humanitarian, and other types of operations other than normal
defense. So these operations, which are outside the historical role ofNATO, have
been approved by the NATO Council. Of course, the theory in approving the
Bosnia operations was that this is also connected to the basic defense of the NATO
countries themselves, by preserving the peace. But these non-traditional type of
operations have been approved by the NATO Council.
Professor George K. Walker, Wake Forest University: I have a comment for
Colonel Burger. First of all, when we drafted the San Remo Manual, we used the
term "due regard" rather than "respect" because of the use of the word "respect"
in the humanitarian law conventions. That is more of a comment. The other is a
question. Ifwe assume that you are going in with "respect" or "due regard" for the
law of the host State, and if we assume that the State would either apply some sort
of international norms to which there is a derogation in time of emergency, or
perhaps they have a national derogation policy, where do you go for your law from
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there? You are going into the host State in an emergency, which by definition
exempts out the environmental norms, what law are you going to apply then?
Colonel Burger: I am not sure that it exempts out all of the environmental norms,
but it certainly is true that you are going in in an emergency. You can not be
expected to follow all of the rules. That is why we use terms like "due regard" or
"respect." There has to be a certain amount of give and take there. The standards
that we would apply in our operations, for example in Italy where we have support
bases, are different than the standards that we would apply if we went into Bosnia
and had forces on the ground in Bosnia.
Mr. William M. Arkin: Colonel Burger, I think you are familiar with the MOU
between your commander and NATO dated 25 July 1995 that was released last
week by the Secretary General's office. It is the confidential MOU that lays out the
rules of engagement regarding the use of force. Under "Targeting Arrangements,"
it says in Paragraph 14, "A joint air plan designed to achieve a graduated response
will be developed by COMAIRSOUTH in coordination with the commander of
the U.N. force. The plan will include attacks on targets selected to achieve the
desired response. Examples of targeting categories, including fixed and mobile
are ..."-and they give three categories or options-"fielded forces including
troop concentrations," "command and control, and supporting lines of
communication," and "direct and essential military support." Then there is a note,
and it says Option I and II targets are within a ZOA (Zone of Action) approved
previously. Option III targets are subject to political approval. But nowhere in this
MOU does it specify what political approval means, who the political authority is
that we are referring to, and what exactly is the reason for Option III targets being
subject to political approval nor what is defined as "direct and essential military
support." So when I read this document, I am sure it is backed up by the NATO
OPLAN 4201 and others, I do not get from it a clear statement of what the
restrictions are, or what types of targets can be attacked under the curren t conflict.
One might argue that this is not an issue yet, but there might be targets which are
controversial, let us say, defined as "direct and essential military support" that
might challenge questions of interpretations of the law. And I am wondering if
you could go into a little bit about how these ambiguous formulations are put into
practice.
Colonel Burger: I think it is improper to call those the rules of engagement. It
was not meant to be so. The rules of engagement are separate and this particular
agreement was to assure proper coordination between the United Nations
Command and the NATO Command so that the decision to target and to choose
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targets would be done in coordination and would not be done at the risk of the
U.N. forces. This came after a lot of difficult discussion between the U.N. and
NATO and how we are going to arm one force or the other, or one mission or the
other. So it is really very incomplete when it refers to how you target or choose
targets.
Colonel David E. Graham, JAGC, U.S. Anny: In an effort to give Jim a break here,
so that he no longer has to defend either U.S. or U.N. policy in Bosnia, I would like
to take contentiousness perhaps to a new height and object to the title of the panel
overall. That is, if we use the terminology used in the panel title, we are going down
a slippery slope, and perhaps beginning to mix apples and oranges with respect to
non-international conflict and MOOTW.
I think because we are significantly involved in both areas, we have to be very
precise about what we call non-international conflict, on the one hand, and
MOOTW on the other. For most of us who have worked this area for a number of
years, non-international conflict means common Article 3 conflicts or conflicts
under Additional Protocol II to the 1949 Geneva Conventions. If you take a look
at Service or Joint literamre or doctrine right now, we have trouble identifying
what we mean by MOOTW, but we have identified specifically 13 different subsets
of military activities or operations that we consider to be MOOTW. None of those
are non-international conflicts. They run the full gamut from arms control to
counter-drug operations in support of civilian authorities to-very imporJantlypeace operations. Under peace operations there are three subsets: support to
diplomacy peacekeeping, traditional peacekeeping, and peace operations. But in
future conferences and discussions, I think it would behoove us to keep
non-international conflict and the law that applies there on the one hand and
MOOTW on the other. I can already see that Jack Grunawalt has his hand raised
so I suppose I accomplished my purpose.
Admiral Robertson: I just want to make one comment before that. I think that
you need to excuse the panel on that because their subject was given to them and
it has a parenthesis, i.e., "military operations other than war-MOOTW."
Professor Jack Grunawalt, Naval War College: Let me carry that one step
further. Dave, I am in full agreement. I would like to point out that we owe this
conference to the benevolence of the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy who
gave us the funding for it. That benevolency came with a few little things which
"thou shalt include." As a matter of fact, Admiral Harlow and I were discussing
this last night and we recognized at the very outset that we were pounding a round
peg into a square hole. I could not agree more with you.
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Colonel Burger: I have just one thought on that. In a simation like we have in the
former-Yugoslavia today, we can really have several layers of conflict going on at
the same time. If you get fighting between Croatia and Serbia, which are two States,
I think that would be an international conflict. If you have fighting within Bosnia
between the Bosnian Government and non-recognized bodies or entities like the
Bosnian Serbians or the Bosnian Croatians, that could be a non-international
conflict. Then, on another layer, you have the U.N. forces in there which are doing
peacekeeping and they are not involved, and maybe they should not be involved,
in a conflict at all. Then you have the difficult situation of NATO getting involved
in support of the peacekeepers. You have to ask, what is their simation? I really
don't have the answers to all of those things but it is a very complex simation and
it presents problems in all of these different areas.
Professor Adam Roberts, Oxford University: I would like to agree with what Ted
Meron said about the way in which principles applicable to international armed
conflict may become extended in one way or another to a non-international armed
conflict. I think that there are ways in which that can happen, additional to those
specifically identified. One has to do with the former-Yugoslavia. We have seen
the very interesting case of one officer with UNPROFOR, whether properly or
legally or otherwise I do not know, surreptitiously emptying a large dam in
territory held by Serbs, but retreating Serbs at the time, so that when they blew
up the dam as it was known that they were threatening to do, it would not in fact
either destroy the dam or flood people lower down the valley. This was an entirely
successful operation, a remarkable piece of environmental protection extended by
international forces to an internal conflict.
Then, of course, one has the case of the application of law to and by U.N.
peacekeeping forces, and their acceptance historically, that the international rules
governing the conduct of armed conflict do apply to U.N. peacekeeping forces.
They also, of course, apply because the individual countries providing contingents
are bound by international conventions, and their internal military disciplinary
systems reflect those conventions.
So there, too, one has an example of the way in which rules developed for
international armed conflicts may become applied through the presence of U.N.
forces, at least in some degree, in non-international armed conflicts. Added to
this-and one forgets this at the time of the terrible conflict in the
former-Yugoslavia-there have been many cases of non-international armed
conflicts in which one party or another or both have agreed to a greater or lesser
degree to apply the body of international rules governing international armed
conflicts.
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Professor Paul C. Szasz: Let me comment a bit on the applicability of
international humanitarian rules to U.N. forces. The question has been raised
about whether or not the U.N. should become a party to the Geneva Conventions
and Protocols. This has been resisted by the Legal Office of the U.N., of which I
was a part at the time, on two basically formal grounds. One is that the Conventions
do not foresee participation by international organizations, and therefore, their
final clauses would have to be changed. The other is that the U.N. is not in a
position to fulfill all the responsibilities of a Protecting Power, therefore, it should
not become party to the Conventions.
The other reason given, that has just been mentioned, is that the U.N. does not
have its own armed forces. It always uses the forces of member States, which are
bound by the customary and treaty rules. This could change. In theory there could
be U.N. forces per se, but as yet there are no plans thereof.
This having been said, the U.N. also considers that it is institutionally bound
by international customary law. So to the extent that rules have been embodied in
customary law, as is generally asserted about the Hague Conventions and the 1949
Geneva Conventions, they also bind the U.N. Secondly, the U.N. would be bound
by resolutions or rules that are promulgated by competent U.N. organs.
Like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which was promulgated by
the General Assembly and is addressed to "all organs of society," therefore
including the United Nations, other conventions developed under the auspices of
the United Nations, and endorsed by the General Assembly, will normally be
considered as binding on the United Nations. I thank you very much.
Professor Meron: In the case of Nicaragua, the International Court of Justice
suggested a sort ofa piecemeal type ofapproach. Those aspects of the conflict which
related to the relations between the Contras and the Sandinista Government would
be governed by those rules of international humanitarian law which apply in
internal conflicts. Those parts of the conflict, ifestablished factually, which pertain
to the intervention by the United States and the Sandinista Government, would
be governed by those rules of international humanitarian law that apply in
international armed conflicts.
Now the problem with this sort of approach is that it would create a structure
of truly Byzantine complexity. People who are law of war experts, and military
officers and international lawyers, would find it extremely difficult to dissect the
various aspects of the problem in which they are concerned in order to be certain
whether it is one set of rules or the other set of rules which is applicable. As regards
the conflict in Yugoslavia, starting with the Bosnia War Crimes Commission
Report, and continuing with what I consider to be the views of the Security
Council, the United States Government and others, the approach was that we have
to look at the entirety of the conflict. When we look at the ensemble of the conflicts
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in Yugoslavia, at least after a certain point in time, and as practical people, people
who have to apply common sense to the solution of problems, we regard that
conflict as international.
I would suggest that although the NATO forces, or the peacekeepers involved
in military operations in this conflict are, of course, not technically parties to the
conflict, to the extent that they resort to military force, the approach exemplified
by Colonel Burger makes a lot of sense. In this situation it does make sense, at least
pragmatically, for them to apply the laws governing international armed conflict,
including protection of the environment. So the context dictates, up to a point,
the selection or choice of the applicable norms that should be applied by entities
that are not technically parties to the conflict yet participating in armed hostilities.
I am saying so in defense of perhaps Professor Grunawalt. Perhaps this connection
and the title of this panel, although not logical, I grant you that, of
non-international armed conflicts and operations other than war, does make, on
practical grounds, a certain amount of sense.
Admiral Robertson: I might add one point to that. I think that many of you are
familiar with the on-going work of Profess or Grunawalt's organization here at the
Naval War College. Not only is he preparing a manual for use by the armed forces,
but also he is lecturing throughout the world on the subject of the rules that are
found in that manual, on ROE and that sort of thing. That brings to mind what
was mentioned a couple of times yesterday-that we have built into our armed
forces an ethic and a culture ofrespect for those rules. Ifwe can spread that broader,
throughout the world, we will have accomplished many of those things that are in
the nine objectives that were referred to by Professor Meron.
I am afraid that we have run out of time, but I will give our panelists one last
opportunity for a summation. No? Then thank you very much. We are adjourned.

